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than the jury's verdict, applies equally to the plaintiff who receives a judgment more
favorable than the verdict.
The trial court had large, though perhaps not unlimited, discretion to compel the
plaintiff to take judgment for the inadequate amount assessed by the jury as the ruling
of a federal court on a motion for a new trial seems ordinarily non-reviewable. Railroad
Co. v. Fraloff, 10o U.S. 24, 31 (1879); Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287
U.S. 474 (I933); see Hinton, Power of Federal Appellate Court To Review Ruling on
Motion for New Trial, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 111 (I933). The plaintiff, therefore, should
not be able to complain if he receives more favorable treatment. The court might well
have regarded the practice of remittitur and the order made in this case as essentially
similar so that the sanction of one practice would be the sanction of the other.
While the power of a federal court is limited by the seventh amendment, this limita-
tion does not necessitate the retention of old forms of practice and procedure nor pro-
hibit the introduction of new devices better adapted to the efficient administration of
justice. Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 165 U.S. 593 (i897);
Grand Trunk Western Ry. v. Lindsay, 2oi Fed. 836 (C.C.A. 7th 1912). Hence, con-
sidering the conceded propriety of the remittitur, the lack of substantial distinction
between it and the order in this case, and the saving of expense and time the new prac-
tice could entail, while accomplishing substantial justice, it is regretted that the circuit
court of appeals did not sanction the order made by the trial court. See Geoffrey v.
Illingsworth, 90 N.J.L. 490, ior Atl. 243 (1913), holding that this practice was per-
missible under the Supreme Court Rules of New Jersey.
Trusts-Charities-Divisibility of Trust Partially Invalid.-[New York].-A
testamentary trust provided for the payment of $i,ooo annually out of income to the
person making the greatest advance toward a cure for cancer, the remainder of the in-
come to go to a hospital for the relief of cancer patients; when a cure had been perfected
to the satisfaction of the trustees, the principal was to be divided equally between the
hospital and the person or persons who had discovered and perfected the cure. In pro-
ceedings for an accounting of the settlor's estate, it was held, the entire trust was in-
valid since it was private in part, providing for gifts to individuals for their own use,
and was of indefinite duration. In re Judd's Estate, 272 N.Y.S. 674 (i934).
Trusts which are in aid of, and tend to advance, learning are considered valid public
or charitable trusts and the charitable purpose may be accomplished by the gifts of
scholarships, prizes, and awards even though the recipients are not in financial need
and may dispose of the benefits as they wish. Ashmore v. Newman, 3 50 111.64, 183 N.E. i
(1932); Coleman v. O'Leary's Executor, 114 Ky. 388, 70 S.W. xo68 (1902); In re Bart-
lett, 163 Mass. 5og, 40 N.E. 899 (1895). See Bogert, Trusts (1921), § 58; Zollman,
Charities (1924), § 300. Where the prizes tend to promote patriotism, the trust is
charitable. Thorp v. Lund, 227 Mass. 474, i16 N.E. 946 (1917). A trust which encour-
ages the fine arts by means of annual awards benefits mankind in general sufficiently
to be considered a charity. Almy v. Jones, 17 R.I. 265, 21 AUt. 616 (189i). The promo-
tion of an important science or industry through the use of prizes and awards may
properly be the object of a charitable trust. Ashmore v. Newman, 350 Ill. 64, 183 N.E. i
(1932); American Academy of Arts and Sciences v. Harvard College, 12 Gray (Mass.) 582
(1832); Palmer v. Union Bank, 17 R.I. 627, 24 Ad. ro9 (1892). Seemingly the court in
the principal case should have had no difficulty in considering as charitable a trust de-
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signed to make more likely the discovery of a cure for cancer by awards to individuals
for meritorious work.
But, accepting the court's holding that part of the trust was non-charitable, it
would not necessarily follow that the entire trust was invalid. Where a trust has both
charitable and non-charitable objects and the non-charitable portion is for some reason
invalid, the charitable portion will generally be sustained if violence is not thereby done
to the settlor's apparent intent. Bogert, Trusts (1921), § 68. If the trustee may devote
the entire property to either the charity or the non-charity alone, the entire trust is
void for uncertainty. Minot v. Attorney General, i89 Mass. 176, 75 N.E. 149 (19o5);
Morice v. The Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. Jr. 399 (i804), affd. lo Ves. Jr. 521 (18o5).
But if the trustee must give something to charity, though the amount be in his discre-
tion, a court will divide the sum equally if the trustee fails to apportion. Salusbury v.
Denton, 3 Kay & J. 529 (1857). See also In re Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 131 Atl. i88
(1925). Where the amounts given to the charity and non-charity are specified and
separable, the courts are generally able to sustain the charity without departing from
the settlor's scheme of distribution. Bristol v. Bristol, 53 Conn. 242, 5 Ati. 687 (1885);
Reasoner v. Herman, i9r Ind. 642, 134 N.E. 276 (1922); Lewis v. Lusk, 35 Miss. 4oi
(1858); Todd v. St. Mary's Church, 45 R.I. 282, i2o Atl. 577 (1923). In the present case
divisibility is complicated by the fact that although the amounts to go to the charity
and non-charity are definite, the income and principal are apportioned differently.
But dividing the principal into two equal parts, one part falling into the residue and the
other part being sustained as a valid charity, thus permitting the charity to receive a
greater proportion of income than was intended, might well have been preferable to
striking down the entire trust.
Wills-Construction of Power of Appointment-Devolution on Invalid Execution
of Power-[Massachusetts].-The principal of a trust created by a testator was to
go to such use as her brother by will or other writing should appoint. The brother
in his own will disposed of his own property and then attempted to dispose of the
property over which he had the general power of appointment by the creation of three
trusts. The cestui of one trust could not take because of a lapse and the other two could
not take because of the rule against perpetuities. The trustee under the will of the
original testator asked instruction as to the disposition of the fund. Held, that the fund
should pass to the administrator of the estate of the brother-donee of the power, and
not to the heirs or administrator of the donor as in default of appointment. Talbot v.
Riggs, i9i N.E. 360 (Mass. 1934).
Because the donee of the power of appointment may properly appoint to himself,
his executors or administrators (Farwell, Powers, (3 d ed. i916) ), some courts have
considered him as the owner of the property subject to the power. Wright v. Wright, 41
N.J. Eq. 382, 4 Ati. 855 (i886); Comm. v. Williams' Executors, 13 Pa. 29 (1849);
Appeal of Appleton, 136 Pa. 354, 2o Aft. 521 (i8go); Roach v. Wadham, 6 East 289
(x8o5). Under such a view, should the donee fail to exercise properly the power, the
property would, of course, pass by intestacy to the heirs or next of kin of the donee.
Little v. Ennis, 207 Ala. i1, 92 So. 167 (1922); Collins v. Collins, 126 Ind. 559, 25 N.E.
704, 28 N.E. 19o (189o); Clark v. Cammann, 16o N.Y. 315, 54 N.E. 709 (1899); see also
2 Page, Wills (2d ed. 1926), 2084-94, §§ 1254-1260.
English courts, in determining the devolution of property subject to a general power
